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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The arrival of Cuba‟s Information Technology (IT) and 
Communications Minister Ramiro Valdés to Venezuela in 
the Spring of 2010 to serve as a „consultant‟ to the 
Venezuelan government awakened a new reality in that 
country. Rampant with deep economic troubles, escalating 
crime, a murder rate that has doubled since Chávez took over 
in 1999, and an opposition movement led by university 
students and other activists who use the Internet as their 
primary weapon, Venezuela has resorted to Cuba for help. 
 
In a country where in large part traditional media outlets 
have been censored or are government- controlled, the 
Internet and its online social networks have become the place 
to obtain, as well as disseminate, unfiltered information. As 
such, Internet growth and use of its social networks has 
skyrocketed in Venezuela, making it one of Latin America‟s 
highest Web users. Because of its increased use to spark 
political debate among Venezuelans and publish information 
that differs with the official government line, Chávez has 
declared the need to rein in the Internet.  Simultaneously, 
Chávez has embarked on an initiative to bring the Internet to 
the poor and others who would otherwise not have access, by 
establishing government-sponsored Internet Info Centers 
throughout the country, to disseminate information to his 
followers.  
  
With the help of Cuban advisors, who for years have been a 
part of Venezuela‟s defense, education, and health care 
initiatives, Chávez has apparently taken to adapting Cuba‟s 
methodology for the control of information. He has begun to 
take special steps toward also controlling the type of 
information flowing through the country‟s online social 
networks, considering the implementation of a government-
controlled single Internet access point in Venezuela. 
Simultaneously, in adapting to Venezuela‟s Internet reality, 
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Chávez has engaged online by creating his own Twitter 
account in an attempt to influence public opinion, primarily 
of those who browse the Web. With a rapidly growing 
following that may soon reach one million subscribers, 
Chávez claims to have set up his own online trench to wage 
cyber space battle. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. As the topic of Venezuela‟s increased use of the 
Internet and online social networks continues to 
evolve and gain influence forming public opinion, 
USG should closely monitor those online social 
networks, particularly as they relate to providing an 
unfiltered view of the country‟s current social reality. 
2. USG should track developments in the 
telecommunications sector as they pertain to the 
government‟s possible attempts to increase the state‟s 
control of the country‟s Internet and the information 
that flows through it, i.e. implementation of a 
government-controlled single Internet access point 
for the country. 
3. Cuba‟s ongoing and increasing role in Venezuela 
should be tracked as it relates to the fueling of 
resignations of high-ranking government/military 
officials and/or their public criticisms of Cuban 
influence in the country. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
From its onset, the government of Hugo Chávez in 
Venezuela has carried out a steady increase in limiting 
Venezuela‟s flow of information to manipulate public 
opinion. This is nothing new for the Chávez government 
which has consistently attempted during more than 11 years 
in power to obtain greater control over the avenues of 
communication.  What is new is Venezuela‟s recent move 
towards increasing control of information flowing through 
the Web, particularly the country‟s online social networks.  
 
This paper looks briefly at the steps Venezuela has taken in 
this area, addressing the influence exerted by Cuban 
advisors, and why Chávez has had to address the country‟s 
online social networks phenomenon.  It argues that the 
increased role the Internet is playing in Venezuelan political 
life coupled with recent domestic events, may have left 
Chávez feeling challenged, resulting in the government‟s 
increased efforts towards controlling information to maintain 
power. 
 
A REGIME UNDER SIEGE  
 
As Latin America has begun to recover from global 
economic turmoil, Venezuela continues to wane in one crisis 
after another, perhaps indicating Chávez‟s popularity may 
not be as strong as it once was. A recent survey revealed 55 
percent of the people in Venezuela reject Chávez, compared 
with 39 percent approval.
1
  While other Latin American 
economies are growing, Venezuela‟s has continued to 
                                                 
1 Casto Ocando, “For Chávez, a difficult year ahead,” The Miami Herald, 
February 7, 2010.  
http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/02/07/1467206/for-Chávez-a-difficult-year-
ahead.html 
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shrink.
2
 The significant increase in crime, the deterioration 
of public services, and an economic crisis during a period of 
oil wealth, have led to increased public protests, particularly 
by university students. The ongoing critical energy shortages 
that have resulted in rolling blackouts in some areas of a 
country in which the greatest resource is energy,  has 
prompted experts to warn Venezuela faces a complete 
electric collapse.
3
 Chávez has attributed the energy crisis to a 
drought Venezuela endured, but experts have cited the main 
reason being the lack of investment in the electrical grid.
4
  
Inflation has also hit the country hard. With the highest 
inflation rate in the region, Morgan Stanley has projected it 
will rise to 45 percent this year alone.
5
  
 
Along with ongoing economic and public utility challenges, 
Venezuela has become one of the murder capitals of the 
world. Figures published by various sources indicate that 
150,000 people in the last decade have been killed by 
criminal gangs, with 80,000 of those deaths having occurred 
in Caracas alone.
6
  The crime rate has more than doubled 
since Chávez took power in 1999; Venezuela‟s own statistics 
agency and police have reported there were close to 14,000 
murders in 2009 compared with almost 6,000 in 1999.
7
 In 
Iraq, which has about the same population as Venezuela, 
there were 4,644 civilian deaths from violence in 2009, 
                                                 
2 Simon Romero, “Venezuela, More Deadly then Iraq, Wonders Why,” New York 
Times, August 22, 2010. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/23/world/americas/23venez.html 
3 Mariano Castillo, “Cuban hire in Venezuela raises concern,” CNN.com, 
February 5, 2010.  
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-02-05/world/venezuela.cuban.adviser_1_energy-
sector-electricity-havana-and-washington?_s=PM:WORLD 
4 Casto Ocando, opp. cit  February 7, 2010. 
5 Jaime Daremblum, “The Cubanization of Venezuela,” Weekly Standard, (Vol. 
15, No. 24, March 8, 2010) 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/cubanization-venezuela 
6 Casto Ocando, opp. cit, February 7, 2010. 
7 Benedict Mander, “Caracas accuses media over crime coverage,” The Financial 
Times, August 24, 2010.http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/555345c0-af98-11df-b45b-
00144feabdc0.html 
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compared to Venezuela‟s over 16,000, according to 
unofficial statistics.
8
 Even Mexico and Colombia, despite 
ongoing drug wars and a ten year insurgent guerilla war, 
have had fewer deaths.
9
 
 
As a result of the increasing crime and murder rates and of 
other domestic disputes, including the suspension of 
broadcasters, Chavez‟s Administration has confronted 
“many days of protests and marches, organized in part online 
through social networking sites.”10 Aware of this, Chávez 
has classified the activity of spreading criticism against the 
government through the Internet as “terrorism” and has 
begun to respond in kind.
11
 
 
INTERNET GROWTH AND ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS 
 
Internet penetration has boomed in Venezuela over the last 
few years. Through the second trimester of 2010, the number 
of subscribers to Internet providers grew 43.1 percent from 
2009 to 2010, according to statistics published by the 
National Commission on Telecommunications (CONATEL). 
This translates to an increase of 2.4 million users during the 
period. The government agency also estimates the total 
number of people with access to the Internet in Venezuela to 
be at 9.7 million, a number that increased 22.9 percent from 
2009 to 2010.
12
  But more than just accessing the worldwide 
Web, Venezuelans are quickly moving up the ranks among 
users of online social networks.  Recent findings by 
comScore, a digital market analysis firm, show Venezuela 
                                                 
8 Simon Romero, “Venezuela, More Deadly then Iraq, Wonders Why,” New York 
Times, August 22, 2010. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/23/world/americas/23venez.html 
9 Ibid.  
10 Mariano Castillo, opp. cit., February 5, 2010.  
11 Ibid.  
12 Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in Washington D.C., August 
26, 2010http://venezuela-s.org/2010/08/26/telecommunications-sector-in-
venezuela-continues-growth/  
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has the world's third highest percentage of Twitter users 
relative to other Internet-connected populations with a 19 
percent penetration rate, only trailing Indonesia and Brazil.
13
 
As of July (2010), the overall number of Twitter subscribers 
in Venezuela was at about 1,705,202 ranking third in Latin 
America behind Brazil and Mexico.
14
 
As the Chávez government has exerted pressure on 
traditional media outlets not in line with it politically, as 
demonstrated by closing newspapers, radio and television 
stations, the Internet became one of Venezuelans‟ primary 
venues for obtaining information. It has also turned into a 
vital tool for the dissemination of information for both the 
Venezuela‟s government and its opponents.  The social 
media boom has impacted the dynamics of Venezuela‟s 
political life as word alerting the public rallies and images 
for and against the government quickly spread through a 
variety of online social networks.   
Venezuela has become highly politicized. This is expressed 
in its use of online social tools as half of the country‟s top 10 
Twitter accounts are news- or politics-related.
15
 To that end, 
a variety of Twitter and Facebook groups across the political 
spectrum have emerged, particularly by the opposition 
regarding the actions the government has taken against 
traditional media outlets. 
16
 
                                                 
13 comScore, Inc., “Indonesia, Brazil and Venezuela Lead Global Surge in 
Twitter Usage, Global Audience to Twitter.com Doubles in Past Year, as Latin 
American Audience Grows Fourfold,”  August 11, 2010. 
http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2010/8/Indonesia_Braz
il_and_Venezuela_Lead_Global_Surge_in_Twitter_Usage 
14 http://www.twitter-venezuela.com/ 
15 Rory Carroll, “Hugo Chávez‟s Twitter habit proves a popular success,” The 
Guardian, August 10, 2010.http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/10/hugo-
Chávez-twitter-venezuela 
16 Groups such as „Voluntad Popular’ (Popular Will);  „Contra la Nueva Ley de 
educacion en Venezuela’ (Against Venezuela‟s new Education law); and 
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The use of the Internet to criticize government has been 
defined by Venezuelan authorities as an act of “terrorism”, 
particularly because of the highly effective use that 
university students and other political and social activists in 
Venezuela have given to online social networks. To counter 
this effect, Chávez, like in other occasions, turned to Havana 
for advice; only this time the guidance on the ground came 
directly from the highest echelons of the Cuban government.  
 
CUBANS ARE THE EXPERTS 
  
The Cuban government has supported President Chávez 
since its inception. “It is no secret Cubans are imbedded 
within Venezuela‟s defense and communication systems to 
the point they would know how to run both in a crises,” 
argues Antonio Rivero, a former Venezuelan brigadier 
general who has broken ranks with Chávez.
17
  Cuba‟s 
influence in Chávez‟s Venezuela goes as far back as October 
2000, when the Chávez and Castro signed a cooperation 
agreement for Venezuela to provide Cuba with oil in 
exchange for technical support in the areas of health care, 
education, sports, and science and technology.  
 
In addition to the estimated 40,000 Cuban teachers, doctors, 
and athletic coaches currently in Venezuela as exchange for 
massive oil subsidies, there has been a steady increase of 
Cuban advisors who are helping to manage – or control-- key 
branches of the armed forces, police agencies, presidential 
                                                                                                    
„Defendamos a Globovisión y la Libertad de Expresión / No al Cierre’ (Let us 
defend Globovision and Freedom of Speech / No to its Closing), as well as 
@nelsonbocaranda – well known and respected journalist/columnist/opinion 
leader; @carlosocariz – Mayor of Sucre (Caracas); @leopoldolopez – former 
mayor of Chacao (Caracas) and leader of Voluntad Popular (Popular Will) 
Movement, among others currently exist as groups Facebook and Twitter users 
can join or subscribe to.  
17 Associated Press, “Aid or undue influence? Cuba sends Venezuela experts to 
train military, work on security,” (Caracas, Venezuela: 31 May 
2010)http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/05/31/aid-undue-influence-cuba-
sends-venezuela-experts-train-military-work-security/ 
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security guard, telecommunications, ports and airports, and 
national identification and public registries. Cuba has helped 
Venezuela to develop improved intelligence capability and 
undermine political opposition. However, the recent 
presence in Caracas of Cuba‟s Vice President of the Council 
State and Minister of Information Technology (IT) and 
Communications, Ramiro Valdés, leads to question Chávez‟s 
intention to take Cuban influence in Venezuela to a higher 
degree, as he understands the predicament of the social and 
political pressures he is facing is very serious. 
The invitation of Ramiro Valdés by the Venezuelan 
government as a consultant to help end the energy crisis 
seems questionable as Valdés lacks energy sector 
experience, but is very well-versed in repressive and control 
tactics. He is a veteran of the 1959 Cuban Revolution who 
fought in the Sierra Maestra mountains alongside Fidel and 
Raúl Castro, and Ernesto “Ché” Guevara.  Considered the 
No. 3 man in the Cuban hierarchy and “an expert in 
managing the repressive organs of a police state,” Valdés 
served as Cuba‟s Interior Minister several times over 50 
years.
18
 Always considered one of the most hard-line 
officials in Castro‟s government, he was the creator of 
Cuba‟s security apparatus that forged closed links with the 
Soviet KGB and the German Stasi secret services.
19
  
Known historically for his repressive tactics, Valdés has 
refined his control methods by adapting to the times. 
Referred to as “El gran censor del Internet” (The Great 
Internet Censor), he is credited as the main architect for 
developing strategies to ensure most Cubans don‟t have 
                                                 
18 Jaime Daremblum, opp. cit. March 8, 2010) 
19 Casto Ocando, “Ministro cubano busca salvar a Chávez” El Nuevo Herald, 
February 7, 2010. 
http://www.elnuevoherald.com/2010/02/07/v-fullstory/647494/visita-de-ministro-
cubano-es-prueba.html 
 9 
 
access to the Internet.
20
 As IT Minister, Valdés oversees the 
‘Universidad de Ciencias Informáticas (University of 
Information Sciences--UCI)’), an elite academic institution 
which aims to form professional personnel to administer, 
protect and secure Cuba‟s online networks, along with 
designing and maintaining Internet sites and creating 
commercial software. Having opened its doors in 2003, the 
UCI has approximately over 40,000 students, the majority of 
which are located at its main campus in Havana.  UCI also 
serves as a recruiting ground for the Ministries of the Interior 
and the Armed Forces, as its top students go on to become a 
vital component of their cybernetic and information war. Its 
students are selected for their high IQs and their political 
trustworthiness, about 80 percent of which are members of 
the Communist Youth.
21
 Additionally, at least over 300 
graduates to date from the UCI have been sent to work as 
information specialists at Venezuela‟s Integral Diagnostics 
Centers.
22
 
 
EXPORTING METHODOLOGY 
 
Internet control measures taken by the Venezuelan 
government appear to be coming from the Cuban advisory 
team led by Ramiro Valdés. Shortly after Valdés‟ arrival in 
Caracas, Venezuela‟s Attorney General called on the 
National Assembly to enact legislation regulating the 
Internet, arguing “it cannot be a space free from law, all 
activities that occur in this national territory must be subject 
                                                 
20 Fabiola Zerpa, “Inexperiencia eléctrica del ministro cubano Ramiro Valdés 
genera dudas sobre su misión”), El Nacional, February 3, 2010. 
http://elnacional.com/www/site/p_contenido.php/ayuda/ayuda/images/productos_
home/comentar/registrovisitantes/images/p_contenido.php?q=nodo/121009/Naci
onal/Inexperiencia-el%C3%A9ctrica-d  
21 Máximo Tomás, “Crisis sacude los cimientos del programa cubano de 
seguridad informática y guerra cibernética”, www.lanuevacuba.com, May 15, 
2006. http://www.lanuevacuba.com/nuevacuba/notic-06-05-1570.htm  
22 Information was provided during a University graduation speech by Melchor 
Gil Morrell, the UCI‟s rector, where Ramiro Valdes was present. 
http://www.uci.cu/?q=node/342 
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to legal regulation.”23 This occurred only two days after 
Chávez publicly declared at a United Socialist Party of 
Venezuela gathering that “the Internet cannot be something 
open where anything is said and done. Every country has to 
apply its own rules and norms.”24  
 
There already has been proposed legislation providing the 
means by which the Venezuelan government could block 
Internet content they dislike; such as the new proposed 
Telecommunications, Informatics and Postal Service 
Organic Law (Ley Orgánica de Telecomunicaciones, 
Informática y Servicios Postales), which would give the 
Venezuelan government authority to institute and control a 
single Internet access point, leading to all messages sent via 
the Web to pass through a government filter.
25
 
 
In fact, Franco Silva, the president of the state-owned 
telephone company CANTV, announced this past March 
(2010) they were already working on the implementation of 
a single Internet access point, arguing it will lead to 
improved connectivity for the country‟s over nine million 
Internet users.
26
 However, a recent study conducted by the 
Latin American School of Networks (Escuela 
Latinoamericana de Redes - EsLaRed) and the Networks and 
Development Foundation (Fundación Redes y Desarrollo -
Funredes), points to the high risks implied by such a 
                                                 
23 Tamara Pearson, “Venezuelan Government Responds to Internet Censorship 
Accusations,” Venezuela Analysis, March 17, 2010. (Venezuelanalysis.com is an 
independent website produced by individuals who dedicated to disseminating 
news and analysis about the current political situation in Venezuela.)  
http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/5195 
24 Reuters, “Venezuela‟s Chávez calls for internet controls,” (Caracas, 
Venezuela: 13 March 2010) 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62D05I20100314 
25 Emiliano Sepúlveda, “Más que probable censura de Internet en Venezuela,” El 
Triangular, February 18, 2010. 
26 Casto Ocando, “Chávez a punto de censurar la Internet,” El Nuevo Herald, 
March 16, 2010. http://www.elnuevoherald.com/2010/03/15/676095/Chávez-a-
punto-de-censurar-la.html 
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measure, especially when the controlling entity is the 
government. “It is very important to note that it is not just a 
single Network Access Point (NAP), but rather a NAP 
controlled by the State. This leads to a national cause for 
concern, given that in the international arena, NAPs are 
traditionally managed by the private sector.”27 
 
Eugenio Yánez, political analyst and editor of Cubanálisis 
mentioned that this policy “is a photocopy of the road 
travelled by Cuba to control the Internet,” 28 adding that the 
one-single Internet access point has been used by Cuba to 
control Internet information on the island.  Macky Arenas, a 
Venezuelan sociologist and journalist, also believes that the 
Venezuelan government also aims to control Internet 
mediums, stating that Chavez wants to implement similar 
methods as those carried out in Cuba, China, Iran and 
Burma. That vision is further strengthened by Chávez 
himself, not only for his verbal attacks against the Internet 
and online social networks, but also by applauding Iranian 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad‟s decision to block the 
Internet to prevent the world from seeing the opposition 
protests in the Islamic nation.
29
 
 
ADAPTING TO THE VENEZUELAN REALITY 
 
As argued in the previous section, several reports indicate 
Chávez favors a strong state control of the Internet, and is 
relying on Cuban methodology in his attempts to achieve 
that objective. He is also adapting concepts of Cuba‟s 
                                                 
27 This Study was conducted by the Latin American School of Networks (Escuela 
Latinoamericana de Redes - EsLaRed) and the Networks and Development 
Foundation (Fundación Redes y Desarrollo -Funredes), both members of the 
Venezuelan Association for Progressive Communications in June 2009.  
http://www.apc.org/es/system/files/CILACIncidenciaNacionalVenezuela_200906
30.pdf 
28 Cubanalisis is an online Think Tank which analyzes Cuba‟s current and 
potential future problems. 
29 Casto Ocando, opp. cit. March 16, 2010.  
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information control model to influence public opinion and 
applying it to Venezuela‟s Internet reality, while 
simultaneously carrying out efforts to exert greater state 
control of the Internet.   Chávez, however, has also taken 
concrete steps to engage in the country‟s increased use of 
online social networks.  
 
While on the one hand publicly attacking Twitter for being 
“a tool of oligarchs and terrorists who use it to spread false 
information and conspire against his government,” Chávez 
has also created his own Twitter account, using it as a means 
to disseminate information.
30
 His Twitter account, 
@Chávezcandanga („candanga‟ means naughty or wild) 
boasts over 800,000 subscribers to date.
31
 However, his 
opening of a Twitter account is not simply to engage in an 
open online dialogue, but rather, as he himself has stated, “to 
have my online trench from the palace to wage the battle.”32  
 
The government has also taken significant steps to promote 
Internet use in general among the poor. In addition to setting 
up public Internet Info Centers in libraries, shopping centers 
and government buildings, it has also set up high-speed 
Internet access centers in poor neighborhoods, totaling over 
600 centers to date.
33
 By making accessible to the country‟s 
poor a service that has traditionally been out of reach for 
them, Chávez has achieved to increase the number of 
followers that comprise the rank and file of his public 
opinion battle online.   
                                                 
30 Rory Carroll, “Hugo Chávez‟s Twitter habit proves a popular success,” The 
Guardian, August 10, 2010. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/10/hugo-Chávez-twitter-venezuela 
31 http://twitter.com/Chávezcandanga 
32 Daniel Cancel, “Chávez Seeks to Join Obama, Castro in Adding Twitter to his 
Media Arsenal,”  Bloomberg.com, April 26, 2010. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-26/Chávez-seeks-to-join-obama-
castro-in-adding-twitter-to-his-media-arsenal.html 
33 National Public Radio, Program: Marketplace, May 17, 2010. 
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2010/05/17/pm-venezuelan-
politics-hot-on-internet/ 
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Following the traditional Latin American populist style, 
Chávez has bypassed state institutions engaging the masses 
directly and appearing to be helping them to resolve their 
problems, while furthering a personal bond with a sector of 
the population. Following that populous path since having 
taken power, his initiative to fully engage in online social 
networks is a new “technological twist” that follows that 
same populist strategy.
34
 According to Carlos Romero, a 
political analyst at the Central University of Venezuela, 
“Twitter has become a fundamental instrument for Chávez. It 
has tremendous propaganda value and is part of his charisma 
mechanism.”35 Chávez himself has stated his Twitter account 
is “another mechanism for contact with the public, to 
evaluate things and to help many people.”36 Claiming to 
have a rapid response team of about 200 people to process 
and respond to complaints and requests from the citizenry 
received via his Twitter account, Chávez states he has 
received “over 287,921 pleas for help, including 19,000 for a 
job, 17,000 for a house, 12,000 for credit and 7,000 for legal 
aid.”37 
 
In addition to utilizing it as a tool for rapid dissemination of 
information and as a way for citizens to connect directly with 
him, Chávez has taken Twitter‟s two way communications 
capability to another level. He has asked citizens to use it to 
carry out their national watchdog duties. Having signed a 
tough new currency law last May (2010), Chávez announced 
police raids on illegal brokerages. As he took to the 
airwaves, he asked his supporters to turn in currency 
speculators and to do so by sending the information via his 
Twitter account.
38
 Evidence also suggests the government‟s 
                                                 
34 Rory Carroll, opp cit. August 10, 2010. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/10/hugo-Chávez-twitter-venezuela 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Associated Press, “Hugo Chávez Asks Citizens To Use Twitter  to Blow the 
Whistle on Currency Speculators,” (Caracas, Venezuela: 6 May 2010) 
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involvement in the world of online social networks includes 
monitoring and controlling individual views that differ from 
the official line, with the recent detention of individuals who 
have engaged in anti-Chávez behavior online.
39
 
                                                 
39 Associated Press, Venezuelan release after arrest for Twitter post,” (Caracas, 
Venezuela: 10 September 2010). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Unlike other countries, where the Internet is utilized as just 
another means to communicate; Venezuela‟s online social 
network boom and its current politicization illustrate this 
viable communications tool has become the principle 
medium where political and social debate are taking place in 
that country. In part a result of the apparent control exerted 
by the government over traditional media outlets, there has 
been a surge of online users, particularly from university 
students and other activists. This has led Chávez to both 
criticize its use for anti-government action as “terrorism” 
while simultaneously engaging in the establishment of a 
Twitter account, with over 800,000 subscribers to date. 
 
Coupled with the arrival of Cuba‟s IT and Communications 
Minister, Ramiro Valdés, which has raised eyebrows, not 
only amongst the Venezuelan opposition and media outlets 
around the world, but in particular among Chávez‟s own 
hierarchy, the government has also begun to take steps to 
exert greater control over online social networks and the 
Internet in general. Among those who have openly criticized 
Cuba‟s influence in Venezuelan communication affairs are 
some of Chavez‟s former comrades. Just a few months back, 
Venezuelan Brigadier General Antonio Rivero resigned his 
post in protest of the role of Cuban advisers in Venezuela.   
 
Since taking power, Chávez has relied on the support and 
advice of Cuba to tackle a variety of issues relating to 
defense, education, and health care, among others. Now that 
online social networks and Internet use have become one of 
his premier challenges to maintaining power, he is once 
again turning to Havana for their know-how. Despite Chávez 
maintaining considerable public support in the country, 
Venezuelans have repeatedly questioned and opposed their 
 16 
 
country becoming another Cuba.
40
 The success of exerting 
influence over the country‟s online social networks through 
the use of Cuba‟s experts and methodology remains to be 
seen. What is undeniable is that Venezuela‟s continued 
evolvement with regard to the Internet, and in particular its 
online social networks, has unveiled the reality that this is 
the primary forum for political discourse and debate in the 
country and as such, it should be followed closely. 
                                                 
40 Andres Oppenheimer, “Hugo Chávez ceding too much control to Cuba,” The 
Miami Herald, May 13, 2010. 
http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/05/13/1626760/Chávez-ceding-too-much-
control.html 
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